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21 Introduction
The literature has found that for the rational expectations equilibrium to be 
uniquely determined, the central bank should raise the nominal interest rate by 
more than one-for-one in response to a rise in the current inﬂation rate (i.e., the 
Taylor principle). On the other hand, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) argue that 
the bank should follow the Taylor principle in response to the rate of expected 
inﬂation but should not raise the interest rate too actively. The reason for this is 
that the equilibrium also becomes indeterminate under a too active forward-
looking interest rate rule.1) Moreover, Batini and Haldane (1999) argue that if the 
forecast horizon of the rule is long, the forward-looking rule makes the economy 
ﬂuctuating.
 However, the related literature contains no work that explains the reason why 
the forward-looking rule makes the equilibrium indeterminate, although it does 
contain work in which the determinacy conditions on policy parameters have been 
derived analytically. Considering that the effects of monetary policy tend to have a 
lag, it is essential for the central bank to formulate a policy rule that is endowed 
with the forward-looking perspective. In addition, it is necessary to investigate the 
performance of a forward-looking rule with a long forecast horizon.
 This paper presents two results. First, indeterminacy emerges under an active 
forward-looking rule because although the central bank succeeds in stabilizing the 
expectations of the future economy, it allows the current economy to ﬂuctuate 
arbitrarily. Second, as the forecast horizon of the forward-looking rule becomes 
long, there is an increase in the dimension of indeterminacy that makes the 
economy more ﬂuctuating.
 The next section presents a basic NK model and the conditions for equilibrium 
determinacy. Section 3 clariﬁes the mechanism of indeterminacy under simple 
assumptions. Section 4 simulates the impulse responses of stable sunspot equi-
libria that are possible under a forward-looking rule. The ﬁnal section contains 
the main results.
2 The Model
We use a basic NK model to obtain the conditions for the determinate rational 
expectations equilibrium as described by Gali (2008, chapter 3):2)
    y˜t = Ety˜t+1 − 1/σ (it − Etπt+1), (1)
 1) Similar arguments are offered by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000, chapter 4) and Woodford 
(2003).
 2) Gali (2008) introduces the natural rate rn in Eq. (1) and the steady state nominal interest 
rate ρ in Eq. (3). We assume rn = ρ = 0 to simplify the analysis. However, our analysis is 
unchanged.
3    πt = βEtπt+1 + κy˜t, (2)
    it = φEtπt+1 + εt.  (3)
Here, y˜t denotes the output gap from its natural level in period t, πt is the rate of 
inﬂation, and it is the nominal interest rate. E is the expectation operator. The last 
equation describes a forward-looking nominal interest rate rule, where φ > 0 is 
the policy parameter representing the magnitude of the central bank’s response to 
expected inﬂation. εt is a single exogenous fundamental shock that satisﬁes 
Et−1εt = 0 for all t. σ > 0, 0 < β < 1, and κ > 0 are parameters.
 Gali (2008) provides the following sufﬁcient and necessary condition for deter-
minacy: 
1 < φ < φ¯,
where φ¯ ≡ 1 + 2σ
(1+β)
κ . This condition suggests that in addition to following the 
Taylor principle (φ > 1), the central bank should not raise the nominal interest 
rate too actively in response to a rise in the rate of expected inﬂation.
3 Mechanism of Indeterminacy
To establish theoretical reasons for the indeterminacy that appears under a 
forward-looking rule, we consider equilibrium solutions under an active rule 
φ = +∞ as a simple case.
3.1 Under an active rule
Proposition 1 For any value of fundamental shock ε in period t, if φ = +∞ under 
Eq. (3), the current equilibrium is indeterminate while the future equilibria are 
determinate as
    πt = κy˜t = −
κ
σit,
    Etπt+j = Ety˜t+j = Etit+j = 0 for j ≥ 1.
The proof is in Appendix A.
 This indeterminacy stems from the characteristic of the forward-looking rule. 
This rule implies that the central bank primarily focuses on stabilizing the expec-
tations of future variables. Then, to the extent that a forward-looking rule is 
active, the bank allows the current economy to arbitrarily ﬂuctuate while satis-
fying Eq. (4). As a result, the too active forward-looking rule makes the current 
equilibrium indeterminate.3)
 3) This characteristic resembles that of a passive rule (φ < 1), in that the bank’s response to the 
ﬂuctuations in the current variables is weak.
           



 (4)
4 This result is in contrast with the equilibrium dynamics under a current 
-looking rule, it = φπt, instead of Eq. (3). Under the same assumptions in 
Proposition 1, the stable equilibrium is uniquely determined as
    Etπt+j = Ety˜t+j = Etit+j = 0 for ∀j.
The derivation is in Appendix B.
 The current-looking rule differs from Proposition 1 in that it makes the current 
equilibrium determinate. This is because the central bank always focuses on 
stabilizing variables in the same period. Then both the current economy and 
future economies are uniquely determined only if φ > 1.
 As our simulations will show later, the mechanism shown in Proposition 1 
works under the forward-looking rule of φ¯ < φ < +∞ in general.
3.2 A long forecast horizon
The implication of Proposition 1 can be applied toward understanding the 
economy in which the central bank responds to the expected inﬂation of a long 
forecast horizon. As a simple example, we consider the following rule instead of 
Eq. (3):
    it = φEtπt+2 + εt. (5)
Proposition 2 For any value of fundamental shock ε in period t, if φ = +∞ under 
Eq. (5), the equilibrium solution has two-dimensional indeterminacy.
The proof is in Appendix C.
 The intuition is similar. Under this rule, the central bank gives top priority to 
stabilizing the expectations of future variables from period t + 2 onward. Then, to 
the extent that a forward-looking rule is active, the bank allows both the current 
and next period’s economies to ﬂuctuate arbitrarily. This leads to two-dimensional 
indeterminacy.
 Proposition 2 is easily generalized as follows.
Proposition 3 For any value of fundamental shock ε in period t, if φ = ∞ under it 
= φEtπt+j for j ≥ 0, the equilibrium solution has j-dimensional indeterminacy.
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2.
 Batini and Haldane (1999) argue that an inﬂation forecast rule with  a long 
forecast horizon risks macroeconomic instability. However, theirs is a reduced-
form model, and thus they do not provide any theoretical reason for the insta-
bility. Proposition 3 suggests that the instability is ampliﬁed by the increase in 
the dimension of indeterminacy.
54 Simulation
We simulate stable sunspot equilibrium dynamics to show that ﬂuctuations in the 
current variables are ampliﬁed to the extent that the central bank respond to the 
expected inﬂation actively. The values of our parameters are taken from Gali 
(2008, p.51): σ = 1, κ = 0.1275, β = 0.99, and φ¯ ≈ 32.2157. In response to a sunspot 
shock in period 0 that generates a 0.1% rise in the expected inﬂation rate in 
period t + 1, we simulate sunspot dynamics under φ = {32.5, 40, 50}. This sunspot 
shock abstracts a situation in which, for example, households expect expansions of 
the future economy. The methodology applied to calculate sunspot equilibria is 
taken from Sims (2002) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2003).4)
 Figure 1 shows the sunspot impulse responses. By assumption, the sunspot 
shock always raises the inﬂation rate in period t + 1 by 0.1%. Sunspot equilibria 
under φ > φ¯ are oscillatory and converging to the steady state. The oscillatory 
convergence under φ > φ¯ originates from the fact that in response to an increase 
in expected inﬂation above the steady state, the bank raises the current nominal 
rate so actively that the current variables drop below the steady state. Thus, vari-
ables in the current and next periods continue to have signs opposite to each other 
around the steady state.5)6)
 The magnitude of φ has a positive effect on the future economy and a negative 
one on the current economy. As φ becomes large, future variables stabilize while 
current variables ﬂuctuate. This is in line with the implication of Proposition 1 
that the central bank succeeds in stabilizing the future economy on the one hand 
and leaves the current economy to ﬂuctuate arbitrarily on the other.7)
 4) Sims (2002) generalizes the methodology of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) to obtain a solution 
of the rational expectations equilibrium. Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) show a methodology 
to obtain the impulse responses of a sunspot equilibrium using Sims’ methodology. The 
details are in Appendix D.
 5) This mechanism is inherently equivalent to that of the sunspot equilibria under φ < 1 that 
smoothly converge to the steady state, as simulated by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003). The 
smooth convergence under φ < 1 is because in response to a rise in the expected inﬂation, 
the central bank raises the current nominal rate less than onefor-one. Then, the positive 
sunspot shock in the expected inﬂation reduces the real interest rate, and the economy is 
modestly adjusted toward the steady state.
 6) If φ reaches unity or φ¯, sunspot responses stop converging.  The equilibrium solutions are 
shown in Appendices E and F, respectively. If φ exceeds these values, the sunspot responses 
explode, leaving only fundamental responses in the neighborhood of the steady state.
 7) Note that this oscillatory dynamic is different from the limit cycle found by Benhabib, 
Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2003). They show the possibility of global indeterminacy under a 
backward-looking rule.
6Figure 1  Impulse Responses to a Sunspot Shock
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75 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the reason why the equilibrium is indetermi-
nate when a forward-looking rule is too active. We also consider the reason for the 
economic instability when the forecast horizon of the rule becomes long.
 The reason for the former is that if an active forward-looking rule is adopted, 
the central bank primarily focuses on stabilizing the expectations of future vari-
ables on the one hand and allows the current variables to ﬂuctuate arbitrarily due 
to a sunspot shock on the other. The reason for the latter is that indeterminacy 
expands in the dimension as the central bank focuses on stabilizing the expecta-
tions of inﬂation in the distant future.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose φ = +∞. For any value of fundamental shock ε in period t, Eq. (3) leads to 
Etπt+1 = 0. This is applied to the expectations in period t + 1 onward. Then,
    Etπt+j = 0 for j ≥ 1. (6)
 Eqs. (2) and (6) derive πt = κy˜t. This is applied to the expectations in period t + 
1 onward. Then, from Eq. (6),
    
Ety˜t+j = 
  πt/κ  for j = 0
                 0      for j ≥ 1
In addition, Eqs. (1), (6), and (7) provide
    
Etit+j =   
−σy˜t for j = 0
                 0    for j ≥ 1
Here, it has an arbitrary value due to a sunspot shock in period t that is irrespec-
tive of fundamental shock ε.
 To summarize, for any value of fundamental shock ε in period t, if φ = ∞ under 
a forward-looking rule it = φEtπt+1, the equilibrium is
    πt = κy˜t = −
κ
σit,
    Etπt+j = Ety˜t+j = Etit+j = 0 for j ≥ 1.
B Equilibrium under it = ∞ · πt
Suppose φ = +∞. For any value of ε in period t, Eq. (3) leads to
    Etπt+j = 0 for ∀j. (8)
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8 Next, Eqs. (2) and (8) provide
    Etyt+j = 0 for ∀j. (9)
 However, if the economy satisﬁes Eqs. (8) and (9), Eq. (1) indicates that the 
nominal interest rate must satisfy
    Etit+j = 0 for ∀j.
In summary, for any value of fundamental shock ε in period t, if φ = ∞ under a 
current-looking rule it = φπt, the equilibrium is
    Etπt+j = Ety˜t+j = Etit+j = 0 for ∀j.
C Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose φ = +∞. For any value of fundamental shock ε in period t, Eq. (5) leads to 
Etπt+2 = 0. This is applied to the expectations in period t + 2 onward. Then,
    Etπt+j = 0 for j ≥ 2. (10)
 Eqs. (2) and (10) give Etπt+1 = κEty˜t+1. This is applied to the expectations in 
period t + 2 onward. Then, from Eq. (10),
    
Ety˜t+j = 
  Etπt+1/κ  for j = 1
                 0           for j ≥ 2
In addition, Eqs. (1), (10), and (11) provide
    
Etit+j = 
  −σEty˜t+1  for j = 1
                 0           for j ≥ 2
 Summarizing the solutions from period t + 1 onward, for any value of funda-
mental shock ε in period t, if φ = ∞ under it = φEtπt+2, the equilibrium is
    Etπt+1 = κEty˜t+1 = −
κ
σEtit+1,
    Etπt+j = Ety˜t+j = Etit+j = 0 for j ≥ 2.
Etit+1 has an arbitrary value due to a sunspot shock in period t that is irrespective 
of fundamental shock ε. This means that the equilibrium solution in period t + 1 
has one-dimensional indeterminacy.
 Further, given the value of Ety˜t+1, the solution in period t is expressed as func-
tions of it as
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    πt = κ(1 + β + 
κ
σ) Ety˜t+1 −
κ
σit,
    y˜t = (1 +
κ
σ ) Ety˜t+1 −
1
σit.
Here, it also has an arbitrary value due to another sunspot shock in period t that 
is irrespective of fundamental shock ε. That is, the solution in period t has greater 
one-dimensional indeterminacy even if Ety˜t+1 is given.
 Therefore, for any value of fundamental shock ε in period t, if φ = ∞ under it = 
φEtπt+2, the equilibrium has two-dimensional indeterminacy.
D Derivation of a Sunspot Equilibrium
Our system is described in the manner employed by Sims (2002) as follows:
Γ0Yt = Γ1Yt−1 + Ψzt + Πηt
where Yt = 
y˜t
πt
Ety˜t+1
Etπt+1

, zt = εt, ηt = 
ηt
y
ηt
π
 
,
Γ0 = 
1    0   −1   (φ − 1) /σ
−κ  1    0        −β
1    0    0        0
0    1    0        0
 
, Γ1 = 
0   0   0   0
0   0   0   0
0   0   1   0
0   0   0   1
 
, 
Ψ = 
−1/σ
   0
   0
   0

, Π = 
0   0
0   0
1   0
0   1

where ηx represents the forecast error of variable x (i.e., xt = Et−1xt +ηxt).
 A solution to the fundamental equilibrium under determinacy is given by equa-
tion (44) of Sims (2002), and this solution corresponds to the solution of the funda-
mental equilibrium under indeterminacy that Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) deﬁne 
under the assumption of orthogonality. A solution to the sunspot equilibrium 
under indeterminacy is the sum of the above fundamental solution and the fore-
cast error component H Q1. − ΦQ2.0
 
 Πη
t
 , the notations of which are taken from 
Sims (2002). These solutions are computed using a MATLAB program ”gensys.m,” 
which is provided on Professor Sims’s homepage.
E Equilibrium under i
t
 = E
t
π
t+1
Suppose that a sunspot shock causes households to believe that the inﬂation rate 
is non-zero and permanently constant; for example, Etπt+j = π ≠ 0 for j ≥ 0. Then, if 
10
φ = 1, the following smooth and non-converging sunspot equilibrium satisﬁes our 
equations:
    Etπt+j = π,
    Ety˜t+j = 
1 − β
κ
π,
    Etit+j = π for j ≥ 0.
F Equilibrium under i
t
 = φ¯E
t
π
t+1
Suppose that a sunspot shock causes households to believe that the absolutes of 
variables are non-zero and constant and that the signs of variables change period 
by period; for example, Etπt+j = (−1)j π ≠ 0 for j ≥ 0. Then, if φ = φ¯ = 1 + 2σ
(1+β)
κ
, the 
following cyclical and non-converging sunspot equilibrium satisﬁes our equations:
	 		 	 πt+j = (−1)j π,
    y˜t+j = (−1)j 
1 + β
κ
π,
    it+j =  (−1)j (1 +  2σ (1 + β)κ  )π for j ≥ 0.
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